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1.  Introduction: Critique of the Dialogue Model   
 
For several years I have been exploring the nature of the dialectical approach to 
argument, its relationship to other approaches, its methodological fruitfulness, and its limitations.  
Although the precise meaning of the dialectical approach is part of the problem, I can say 
immediately that I mean it in the sense in which it is distinguished from monological or 
monolectical approaches, and not in the sense it is distinguished from logical and rhetorical 
approaches; for these two distinctions criss-cross each other, as is obvious from the work of 
many scholars that is both dialectical and logical (Barth and Krabbe 1982; Blair and Johnson 
1987; Woods and Walton 1989).  My main motivation stems from the fact that the dialectical 
approach has become the dominant one in argumentation theory.1  Now, whenever any approach 
in any field becomes dominant, there is always the danger that it will lead to the neglect or loss 
of insights which are easily discernible from other orientations; this in turn may even prevent the 
dominant approach from being developed to its fullest as a result of the competition with other 
approaches. 
Let us begin with a review of some background results from the relevant literature.  One 
of the best examples of the dialectical approach is a work entitled From Axiom to Dialogue by 
Else Barth and Erik Krabbe (1982; cf. Barth and Martens 1982).  A critical examination of this 
work reveals that their achievement is not really to demonstrate the necessity to move from the 
axiomatic to the dialectical approach, by reducing the former to the latter; instead the structure of 
their proof is to demonstrate the equivalence of the methods of axiomatics, natural deduction, 
and formal semantics to the method of formal dialectics.  However, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Finocchiaro 1995), the proof works both ways, so that the former methods acquire the merits of 
the latter, and the latter the limitations of the former; and the unintended consequence is that 
there is no logical difference between the axiomatic and the formal-dialectical method, and their 
difference will have to be located in some other domain.2
Another extremely important result is due to James Freeman’s (1991) work on Dialectics 
and the Macrostructure of Arguments and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans’s (1992) work on 
Analysing Complex Argumentation.  They have independently provided a dialectical analysis of 
complex argumentation, namely arguments where a conclusion is supported by more than just a 
single reason, either in the sense that two or more distinct reasons are given to support the 
conclusion, or in the sense that the reason which directly supports the conclusion is itself in turn 
supported by another reason.  Their main accomplishment is to interpret arguments as the result 
of a hypothetical dialogue between a proponent or respondent and an opponent or challenger, a 
process during which the opponent asks various kinds of questions.  However, as I have also 
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argued previously (Finocchiaro 1995, 193-94; 1999, 195-96), the questions asked are by and 
large evaluative questions, and so besides explicitly providing an illustration of the power of 
what might be called the informal-dialogical method, these authors have also implicitly 
suggested the evaluative dimension of complex argumentation.  They may also be seen as having 
stressed the importance of complex argumentation and suggested that the usual emphasis on 
simple arguments is an undesirable oversimplification.3
A move in this direction (toward evaluation and complexity) has also been independently 
made by J. Anthony Blair.  In a paper entitled “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument” 
(Blair 1998), he has distinguished thirteen levels of complexity of dialogues depending on the 
complexity of the argument allowed at each turn of the dialogue; the thirteenth level is the one 
which is the norm in a scholarly paper or commentary.  Blair also distinguishes between what he 
labels “solo” arguments and “duet” arguments: in solo arguments the respondent and audience 
are physically absent; their identity may not be known or fixed; and the norms of the discussion 
are not settled but open to dispute.  Then he argues plausibly that to speak of dialogues for 
complex or solo arguments is metaphorical at best and probably distorting.  Blair concludes with 
some theses that embody both a non-dialogical conception of the dialectical approach and of solo 
arguments.  His words are worth quoting at length: 
 
It would be nice if the term ‘dialectical’ were reserved to denote the properties of all 
arguments related to their involving doubts or disagreements with at least two sides, and 
the term ‘dialogue’ were reserved to denote turn-taking verbal exchanges between pairs 
of interlocutors.  Then I could use this terminology to express the points that (1) all 
argumentation is dialectical, but by no means is all argumentation dialogical, and (2) the 
dialectical properties of dialogues, and the norms derived from the dialogue model, do 
not apply to non-dialogical argument exchanges, even though the latter are dialectical 
too.  In other words, both duet arguments and solo arguments are dialectical, but only 
duet arguments are dialogues (Blair 1998, 10).4
 
One final explicitly critical contribution deserves mention.  Chris Reed and Derek Long 
have stressed the importance and pervasiveness of what they call “persuasive monologue.”  A 
persuasive monologue is not merely a soliloquy, which is “a record of a chain of reasoning” 
(Reed and Long 1998, 2); nor an internal dialogue, “in which the speaker plays both roles” 
(ibid.); nor a “turn in dialogue” (ibid.).  Instead persuasive monologue has two main 
characteristics: “firstly, the intuitive ‘case building’ of presenting arguments in support of the 
thesis” (Reed and Long 1998, 3); and “secondly, there is the more complex technique of 
presenting counterarguments to the thesis propounded, and then offering arguments which defeat 
those counterarguments” (ibid.)  Although these authors’ main interest seems to be the formal 
analysis and the computerized modeling of persuasive monologues, the point I would want to 
stress is that the second clause of their definition refers to replying to objections, and such 
criticism of counterarguments is a feature which many would not hesitate to call dialectical, in a 
sense of this word distinct from dialogical. 
The upshot of these preliminary remarks is as follows. Proponents of the dialectical 
approach tend to presuppose a particular concept of dialectics, pertaining to dialogue or turn-
taking; and they have produced results implicitly suggesting that dialogue may be dispensable (in 
favor of either deductive axiomatization or argument complexity and evaluation).  Critics of the 
dialectical approach tend to stress monological argumentation, but in so doing they are quite 
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sensitive to an aspect of argument which is dialectical in a sense other than the dialogical one (a 
sense pertaining to doubting with two sides and defeating counterarguments).  With this 
literature and these reflections in the background, I now want to examine a particular problem, to 
try to understand the difference (if any) between a dialectical and a nondialectical approach to 
this problem, and the implications (if any) of the respective solutions to the question of the 
relative merits of the two approaches.  The problem is that of how argument is to be conceived. 
 
 
2.  Concepts of Argument   
 
Let us begin with what may be called the traditional conception of argument, or to be 
more precise, a version of the standard textbook definition.  As many authors have done (Walton 
1990, 408-9; Johnson 2000a, 146; Hansen 2002, 264), I too find it useful to quote Copi’s 
definition: “An argument, in the logician’s sense, is any group of propositions of which one is 
claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing support or grounds for the 
truth of that one” (Copi and Cohen 1994, 5).5
However, although many of the same authors (e.g., Johnson 2000a, 148) take this to be a 
structural definition, I find it improper and misleading to speak of structure here because the 
structure involved is too insignificant to merit the name.  The traditional concept does indeed 
define an argument as an ordered set of propositions, but the order introduced is simply that of 
designating one of the propositions as the conclusion; in other words, a distinction is made 
among all the propositions in the set, a distinction between the conclusion and the premises.  
However, such a single partition does not really yield a genuine structure, which for my 
sensibility would have to have at least two partitions; that is, the minimal order I would want 
before calling it a structure is three propositions interrelated in such a way that one is supported 
by the second, which is in turn supported by the third.  Instead of calling it structural, one might 
call this aspect of the traditional definition relational. 
A second important feature of Copi’s definition is the reference to the intention or 
purpose of the arguer.  Again, although many commentators (e.g., Johnson 2000a, 148) have 
denied such a teleological character, it seems obvious to me that when Copi says that the 
conclusion is claimed to follow from the premises, he is saying that the arguer claims this.  And 
when he says that the premises are regarded as providing support or grounds for the conclusion, 
he is saying that the premises are so regarded by the arguer; that is, the arguer intends to use the 
premises to support the conclusion.  In short, the purpose of the argument is to justify the 
conclusion by means of supporting reasons. 
I am stressing that according to Copi’s version of the traditional definition, an argument 
has function but no structure.6  I believe there is a term that conveys both features, namely the 
term illative, which I adopt from Ralph Johnson (2000a, 150), who adopted it from Blair (1995).  
This traditional definition may thus be called the illative conception of argument.  Illation is the 
special relationship that holds between premises or reasons and conclusion or thesis; it is not a 
purely abstract relation, but one that subsists in the mind of the arguer and of anyone trying to 
understand or evaluate the argument. 
Two other versions of the traditional definition are worth mentioning, one more and one 
less abstract than the illative conception.  The more abstract one avoids any reference to purpose 
and defines an argument simply as an ordered set of propositions partitioned into two subsets.  
For example, in Choice and Chance, Brian Skyrms stipulates that “an argument is a list of 
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sentences, one of which is designated as the conclusion, and the rest of which are designated as 
premises” (Skyrms 1966, 1-2).7  Those scholars who deny the teleological character of the 
traditional definition are probably thinking of this version, although of course it should not be 
equated with other versions such as Copi’s. 
The less abstract (or more concrete) version of the traditional definition adds a rhetorical 
condition to the illative conception, namely an element of persuasion.  This conceives an 
argument as an attempt to persuade others that a conclusion is true by giving reasons in support 
of it.  An example of such a definition comes from Michael Scriven’s book Reasoning: “The 
simplest possible argument consists of a single premise, which is asserted as true, and a single 
conclusion, which is asserted as following from the premises, and hence also to be true.  The 
function of the argument is to persuade you that since the premise is true, you must also accept 
the conclusion” (Scriven 1976, 55-56).8
These three versions of the traditional conception are importantly different, and constitute 
a sequence of increasingly more complex and narrow9 definitions (as one moves from the purely 
abstract one through the illative one to the rhetorical).  But they also share some very important 
features.  All three lack any reference to a complex structure, or structure worthy of the name, as 
I have already mentioned.  And all three lack any reference to dialectical matters, which will be 
our focus.  Thus, let us now turn to what we may call the dialectical conception of argument. 
The most natural version of the dialectical conception simply adds an element of 
criticism of objections to what I have called the rhetorical definition.  We thus get that an 
argument is defined as an attempt to persuade someone that a conclusion is acceptable by giving 
reasons in support of it and defending it from objections.  The best known example of this is the 
definition found in Johnson’s book Manifest Rationality: “An argument is a type of discourse or 
text—the distillate of the practice of argumentation—in which the arguer seeks to persuade the 
Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that support it.  In addition to this 
illative core, an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his 
dialectical obligations” (Johnson 2000a, 168). 
There is no time here for me to repeat or summarize the various clarifications that have 
been made to Johnson’s definition by Johnson (2002a; forthcoming) himself as well as by Trudy 
Govier (1998; 1999b; 2000), David Hitchcock (2002a), Hans Hansen (2002), and others 
(Groarke 2002; Leff 2000; Tindale 2002; Rees 2001; Wyatt 2001), although I will say a little 
more later in the context of my analysis of Johnson’s argument (section 6, below).  However, I 
have already implicitly incorporated many of these clarifications when I gave my own 
formulation, before exemplifying it with Johnson’s definition.  In any case, a few remarks are in 
order and may be relatively novel. 
One thing I would want to point out is that by calling illative core the complex of 
conclusion and supporting reasons, Johnson suggests that the illative core is more fundamental 
than the dialectical tier.  Now, this may very well be true; but it may not be.  I would regard it as 
open question.  Of this more presently.  However, in order not to beg this question, I shall speak 
of the illative tier or component rather than core. 
Another question I would want to ask is, why call dialectical tier or discharge of 
dialectical obligations such things as examination of alternative positions and reply to 
objections?  What is the concept of dialectics inherent in such a terminological decision, and how 
is such a conception to be justified?  Is it enough to do some hand waving in the direction of 
Plato’s dialogues?  Johnson’s concept of dialectics is the one inherent in the following explicit 
statement: “that argumentation is dialectical means that the arguer agrees to let the feedback 
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from the other affect her product.  The arguer consents to take criticism and to take it seriously.  
Indeed, she not only agrees to take it when it comes, as it typically does; she may actually solicit 
it.  In this sense argumentation is a (perhaps even the) dialectical process par excellence” 
(Johnson 1996, 107; cf. Johnson 2000a, 161; cf. Finocchiaro 1999, 195). 
Third, besides Johnson’s references to written text, argumentative practice, purpose, 
persuasion, and truth, it is important to note the reference to both the illative and dialectical 
components or tiers.  This implies that a text with an illative tier but without a dialectical one is 
not strictly speaking an argument (as some of Johnson’s critics have pointed out, thus yielding an 
alleged reductio ad absurdum of his definition); but Johnson himself prefers to say that such a 
text “does not fit the paradigm case of argument” (Johnson 2002a, 316). 
In the present context, however, the point I want to stress is that there is a natural way to 
moderate Johnson’s double requirement by disjoining the two conditions, in the sense inclusive 
disjunction.  We thus get the following conception: an argument is an attempt to persuade 
someone that a conclusion is true by giving reasons in support of it or defending it from 
objections.  This is a weaker dialectical conception than Johnson’s definition, but it still is 
importantly dialectical because it does call attention to the potential need to discharge one’s own 
dialectical obligations, and because the inclusive disjunction obviously allows for cases where 
the argument contains both illative and dialectical tiers. 
Such a more moderate dialectical conception has in fact been advanced by some 
scholars.10  If I understand him correctly, I believe Alvin Goldman does this in his book 
Knowledge in a Social World.  He explicitly allows for what he labels monological 
argumentation besides dialogical argumentation, as can be seen from this passage: “If a speaker 
presents an argument to an audience in which he asserts and defends the conclusion by appeal to 
the premises, I call this activity argumentation.  More specifically, this counts as monological 
argumentation, a stretch of argumentation with a single speaker.  … I shall also discuss 
dialogical argumentation in which two or more speakers discourse with one another, taking 
opposite sides of the issue over the truth of the conclusion” (Goldman 1999, 131).  And for 
Goldman, a crucial principle governing dialogical argumentation is this: “when there are existing 
or foreseeable criticisms of one’s main argument, a speaker should embed that argument in an 
extended argumentative discourse that contains replies to as many of these (important) criticisms 
as is feasible” (Goldman 1999, 144). 
We thus have two versions of the dialectical conception of argument, a stronger one 
exemplified by Johnson that regards the dialectical or critical tier as necessary for any argument, 
and a moderate one exemplified by Goldman that makes the dialectical or critical tier essential 
for one type of argument but not for all.  Although these two versions of the dialectical 
conception are the most common and natural ones, there is actually a third version that deserves 
discussion and may be regarded as more strongly dialectical than Johnson’s conjunctive version.  
This hyper dialectical conception would define an argument as an attempt to justify a conclusion 
by defending it from objections. According to this conception, replying to objections is both a 
sufficient and a necessary condition to have an argument; whereas for Johnson’s strong 
dialectical conception, replying to objections is necessary but not sufficient; and for Goldman’s 
moderate dialectical definition, replying to objections is sufficient but not necessary. 
Unintuitive as it may sound, the hyper dialectical conception has been advanced by some 
scholars.  In a 1980 book by the present author, entitled Galileo and the Art of Reasoning, in the 
context of a number of theoretical considerations, we find the following theoretical definition: 
“We may then say that an argument is a defense of its conclusion from actual or potential 
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objections” (Finocchiaro 1980, 419).  More recently, in her review of Johnson’s Manifest 
Rationality, Agnès van Rees has criticized his definition of argument for being insufficiently 
dialectical.  Here are her revealing words: “According to this definition, producing reasons and 
discharging one’s dialectical obligations are two different things.  But in actual fact, if the notion 
of argument is indeed to be rooted in the dialectical practice of argumentation, the two should 
coincide.  In a truly dialectical account, argument per se would be defined as an attempt to meet 
the critical reactions of an antagonist, that is, to take away anticipated objections and doubt” 
(Rees 2002, 233).11  And besides these two explicit formulations, the hyper dialectical definition 
has a memorable, emblematic, and brilliant illustration; that is, an argument by Alan M. Turing 
published in 1950 in the journal Mind, advocating that machines can think based primarily on a 
critique of nine objections to this conclusion.12
Once again, however, despite the differences among these three versions of the dialectical 
conception, my focus will be on what they have in common.  Their common element is an 
emphasis on replying to objections or to criticism.  It is such a dialectical component that 
provides an instructive contrast to the illative conception.  And it is this dialectical tier that I 
want to understand better and evaluate.  With such an aim, the next step will be to examine 
various arguments that have been advanced in favor of the dialectical conception of argument. 
 
 
3.  Arguments for the Dialectical Definition   
 
What we are faced with now is an exercise in informal logic and critical thinking, for 
what we want to do is to identify, interpret, reconstruct, analyze, evaluate, and criticize the 
arguments for the dialectical conception of argument.  I shall focus explicitly on arguments 
advanced by Johnson and by Goldman, but implicitly underlying my examination will be 
arguments suggested by the present speaker in the above mentioned 1980 book, and by John 
Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty.  There will be no time or space for me to elaborate my 1980 
arguments for the hyper dialectical conception, or to search for Rees’s argument for the same 
conception, or to examine Mill’s arguments, which will have to be done on some other occasion.  
However, one additional remark on Mill is worth making. 
Mill has already been injected into this discussion by an insightful interpretive hunch of 
Hansen (2002, 271), when he spoke of Mill’s “dialectical method” and quoted a crucial passage 
from Mill’s essay On Liberty.  This reference led me to read Mill, and I discovered that the 
second chapter of his essay contains some of the strongest and most instructive arguments.  Mill 
is ostensibly arguing for the thesis that freedom of expression of opinion is essential in the quest 
for knowledge and search for truth, but the connection with our topic becomes evident when we 
see that a key part of freedom of expression involves the freedom to express dissenting opinions, 
which in turn involves the toleration (and indeed the encouragement) of counterarguments; thus 
truth and knowledge require the understanding and criticism of counterarguments.  We can get a 
glimpse and flavor of the relevance and importance of Mill’s considerations from the following 
striking assertion: “When we turn to subjects [such as] morals, religion, politics, social relations, 
and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in 
dispelling the appearances which favor some opinion different from it” (Mill, On Liberty, ch. ii, 
par. 23; 1965, 286-87). 
For now, let me focus on an argument that has been advanced by Goldman, or at least 
which I extract from Goldman; it deserves discussion because of its novelty.  What he intends to 
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justify is “a general thesis about critical argumentation and the probability of acquiring truth … 
that lively and vigorous debate is a desirable thing”( Goldman 1999, 144), desirable in the sense 
that it “has positive veritistic properties” (Goldman 1999, 146).  In other words, critical 
argumentation is likely to lead to the truth.  The connection between this conclusion and the 
dialectical conception of argument may be elaborated as follows.  Goldman (1999, 132) says that 
“critical argumentation is an attempt to defeat or undercut the proffered argument,” and he 
contrasts it to “proponent argumentation [which] is a defense of the asserted conclusion by 
appeal to the cited premises” (Goldman 1999, 132).  To this I add that if critical argumentation is 
a veritistically good thing, then it will also be desirable for the special case when the proffered 
argument is a critical argument, and so a reply to the critical argument is called for.  Such a reply 
is precisely what the dialectical conception of argument stipulates. 
Next, Goldman distinguishes at least three subtypes of critical argumentation, one that 
denies the truth of a premise, a second that questions the link between premises and conclusion, 
and a third one which he calls “presenting a defeater” (Goldman 1999, 140).  Then he formulates 
his argument for the special case of the latter, which is a notion he adopts from John Pollock 
(1986, 33-39; cf. Goldman 1999, 138-39, 139 n .11, 144-45) and may be explained as follows.  
Given an argument with premises P-1 through P-n and conclusion C, a defeater is a critical 
argument with the same premises plus one additional special premise D and conclusion not-C.  A 
simple example given by Goldman himself is this: consider the argument that it will probably 
rain tonight because it was so stated last night in the local weather forecast of a reliable news 
medium; a defeater of this argument would be the counterargument that it will probably not rain 
tonight because although it was so stated last night in the weather forecast of a reliable local 
news media source, it was also stated this morning by the same source that the forecast had 
changed and the new prediction was fair weather tonight. 
I will label Goldman’s argument the “truth-in-evidence” argument because it is based on 
a premise which he himself calls the truth-in-evidence (TEP) principle; it asserts the following: 
“a larger body of evidence is generally a better indicator of the truth-value of a hypothesis than a 
smaller, contained body of evidence, as long as all the evidence propositions are true and what 
they indicate is correctly interpreted” (Goldman 1999, 145).  He points out that this principle is 
an epistemic version of the requirement of total evidence discussed in a methodological context 
by Rudolph Carnap (1950, 211) and Carl Hempel (1965, 64-67).  Goldman also says that the 
principle is a generalization of Bayes’ theorem.  Although these are reasons of sorts, and 
although the principle has some inherent plausibility, Goldman (1999, 145-46) confesses that “I 
have no proof of this postulate.” 
But how does this principle support his conclusion that critical argumentation, or at least 
defeater presentation, is conducive to truth?  Clearly, a defeater argument does encompass a 
larger body of evidence than the argument being criticized.  So, Goldman’s premise is indeed 
relevant.   
But is it sufficient?  He attempts to articulate such sufficiency by commenting on the two 
provisos incorporated into the principle.  The condition of truth for the evidence propositions 
could be somewhat relaxed (he says) by requiring merely that they be justified.  The other 
condition was that what the evidence propositions indicate be correctly interpreted; this seems to 
mean that it be correct to claim that the premises of the defeater argument imply or support the 
denial of the conclusion of the original argument.  And Goldman himself suggests that in real-
world cases such an implication would be itself controversial.  The upshot of his articulation 
seems to be that in order for a defeater argument to have positive veritistic properties in 
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accordance with the truth-in-evidence principle, the defeater has itself to be a good argument, 
namely have true or justified or acceptable premises, and these premises have to really support 
its own conclusion; but in realistic situations such goodness would be controversial. 
Goldman seems to be aware of such difficulties, for despite his articulation and 
elucidation, what he claims about the premise-conclusion link of his argument is very modest.  
He says: “Suppose … that (TEP) is correct.  May we derive from it the veritistic desirability of 
engaging in defeater argumentation?  In other words, does (TEP) imply that defeater 
argumentation usually has positive V-value?  Although I shall not attempt to prove it, I suspect 
that this does follow” (Goldman 1999, 146). 
Another difficulty that could be raised stems from the fact that Goldman intends his 
argument, which is specifically formulated in terms of defeater arguments, to apply to other 
cases of critical argumentation.  However, its relevance to these other cases is questionable. 
But to end on a more positive note, there are other valuable aspects of an argument 
besides such properties as truth of premises and validity of inference, or acceptability, relevance, 
and sufficiency of premises.  Some of the additional values are what might be called 
suggestiveness or fruitfulness and novelty or originality.13  And along these dimensions, I would 
rate Goldman’s truth-in-evidence argument very highly. 
 
 
4.  Johnson’s Argument: Its Illative Tier 
 
Let us now examine Johnson’s argument for the dialectical conception.  As one would 
expect, his argument possesses an illative component as well as a dialectical tier, and the latter 
contains both replies to objections and criticism of alternative positions.  The main alternative is 
what he calls the structural definition of argument, which (as suggested above) is not really 
structural and should rather be labeled the illative conception of argument. 
One of Johnson’s key supporting reasons I locate in passages where he makes statements 
such as the following: 
 
Philosophers and others for whom argumentation is the principal methodology routinely 
include in their own arguments a section in which they voice and then deal with 
objections to their position.  … If…we look at the best practices of those who have the 
most at stake in this process, philosophers and logicians who have a vested interest in this 
practice, we will find that their arguments always take account of the standard objections.  
… Arguments with a dialectical tier are found in nonacademic discourse as well  
(Johnson 2000a, 165-66). 
 
Here we have an empirical argument, which some would call an induction by 
enumeration, and others more simply a generalization argument or an inductive generalization.  
Although in his book Johnson does not himself categorize this argument in this manner, I am 
encouraged to advance this interpretation by the fact that in one of his papers he does speak 
favorably of the “empirical turn” (Johnson 2000b, 14-15).  Moreover, such a strand of argument 
is also found in other dialectically inclined authors.  For example, Goldman, after defining an 
“extended argumentative discourse” as a series of nested arguments that present and answer 
objections, states that “in science, scholarship, law, and other polemical realms, extended 
argumentative discourses are the norm.  Scholars are expected to report existing findings and 
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literature that form the basis of predictable objections” (Goldman 1999, 144). 
Also reminiscent of such an empirical argument is Mill’s assertion, quoted earlier, that 
three-fourths of arguments involving human affairs consist of attempts to reply to objections. 
If and to the extent that Johnson’s case for the dialectical conception of argument 
includes an empirical inductive generalization, then its evaluation would have to deal with 
questions such as the following.  For example, if indeed the best examples of arguments by 
philosophers have a dialectical tier, should our conclusion be that good philosophical arguments 
have a dialectical tier, or that all philosophical arguments have a dialectical tier?  In other words, 
that all philosophical arguments ought to have a dialectical tier, or that they do have a dialectical 
tier?  Can our conclusion be that good arguments in general (whether philosophical or not) have 
a dialectical tier; in other words, from a sample containing information about philosophical 
arguments, how can we reach a conclusion about arguments in general?  Do we not also need 
data about the characteristics of arguments in other disciplines, such a science and the law, as 
Goldman indicates?  But if we gather such data about, for example, science, such scientific 
arguments that thus have a dialectical tier may happen to be those in special domains of scientific 
activity, such as in the context of peer discussion at the frontiers of research or in periods of 
scientific revolution; what are we then to say about other domains such as the context of 
scientific justification or the context of pedagogy or periods of normal science?  And if indeed, 
as Mill states, three-fourths of arguments have a dialectical tier (indeed only this tier), should not 
the conclusion be qualified to make it a statistical rather than a universal generalization?  And 
what are we to say about the other one-fourth of arguments?  Finally, if we take seriously the 
possibility of an empirical inductive confirmation of the dialectical conception of argument, does 
not the above mentioned evidence appear as merely anecdotal?  Should we not attempt to devise 
more systematic and controlled tests or data gathering? 
Some scholars have indeed undertaken such attempts.  I am thinking of Hitchcock’s 
(2002b) sampling of scholarly arguments to test his theory of inference; of David Perkins’s 
(1989; Perkins et al. 1983) studies of the difficulties in everyday reasoning; and of the present 
author’s examination of arguments in Galileo’s Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems 
(Finocchiaro 1980; 1994).  I believe that by and large the relevant parts of such inquiries do 
support the thesis of the dialectical nature of argument.  In fact, it was in the context of such an 
empirical investigation that the present writer drew the conclusion mentioned earlier and labeled 
the hyper dialectical conception of argument, namely “that an argument is a defense of its 
conclusion from actual or potential objections” (Finocchiaro 1980, 419). 
Although such an empirical approach has also been appreciated or advocated by other 
philosophers (Barth 1985; Krabbe 2000, 4), it is unlikely that most philosophers will have much 
interest in using such empirical argumentation to support their theories of argument; so let us go 
on to more theoretical and conceptual considerations, especially since we find such supporting 
reasons in Johnson’s book. 
A second supporting reason in Johnson’s illative tier is a premise about the nature of the 
process of arguing.  He states that “the process of arguing includes, by its very nature, feedback 
from the Other.  Nor does the process of arguing end there.  Also included as part of the process 
must be the response by the arguer to those objections and criticisms, as well as any revisions 
made by the arguer” (Johnson 2000a, 157).  If we recall that for Johnson an argument is the so-
called “distillate of the practice of argumentation” (Johnson 2000a, 168), then the relevance and 
sufficiency of this premise becomes obvious.  What about its acceptability?  Here we have to 
remember that Johnson is talking about one of several meanings of the word argue or arguing; 
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and certainly for this particular meaning it is unobjectionable and true that the process of arguing 
does have such a dialectical component. 
However, this claim about the nature of the process of arguing is almost analytically true.  
So an unfriendly evaluator14 might at this point raise the possibility that Johnson’s argument 
from the nature of the process of arguing begs the question.  But a more friendly critic might 
point out that the function of this particular argument is to articulate a necessary connection 
between the process of arguing and the concept of argument, and the articulation of such analytic 
relations is a normal part of any theorizing; thus it is no defect of a theory of argument that at 
some point it has to explain the links among various elements of its conceptual structure.  
However, such friendly criticism may have a consequence that suggests some possible revision 
by the arguer.  That is, some arguments do not have rational persuasion as their telos, but rather 
the analytic elucidation of conceptual relations; and this is one of those arguments.  But if we 
defend this argument in this manner from the criticism that it begs the question, then one has to 
revise the teleological rhetorical aspect of Johnson’s definition.  This could be done by stating 
the definition by saying that an argument is an attempt to justify a conclusion instead of saying 
that it is an attempt to persuade others that a conclusion is true. 
Another way out might be to say that here both the friendly critic and the unfriendly 
evaluator are committing the fallacy of straw man, when they interpret these considerations 
about the nature of the process of argument as an argument in support of Johnson’s definition; 
after all, he does not himself explicitly label them an argument.  This denial of argumentative 
status would by itself be unproblematic, but it would begin to weigh if added to the previous 
unfriendly evaluation that Johnson’s empirical inductive generalization was anecdotal.  For one 
reply to that evaluation might have been that his empirical considerations should not be 
interpreted as a real or full-fledged empirical argument susceptible of evaluation in terms of the 
adequacy, variety, and representativeness of the sample used; and then we would be saying that 
neither the empirical considerations nor the conceptual ones were arguments.  However, this 
consequence would not be fatal because there is at least one passage in Johnson’s book that 
seems to advance a supporting reason as explicitly as the practice of argumentation allows.  To 
this we now turn. 
This is the passage where Johnson tries to ground the dialectical tier on the telos of 
rational persuasion.  In his own words, “because the practice exists to achieve rational persuasion 
of the Other as a rational agent, the practice must also be dialectical” (Johnson 2000a, 160).  To 
avoid straw-man problems, I quote this argument verbatim: 
 
Because the arguer’s purpose is rational persuasion, a second tier is required as well.  
Why?  I have shown that the practice of argumentation presupposes a background of 
controversy.  The first tier (the illative core) is meant to initiate the process of converting 
Others, winning them over to the arguer’s position.  But they will not easily be won over, 
nor should they be, if they are rational.  The participants know that there will likely be 
objections to the arguer’s premises.  Indeed, the arguer must know this, so it is typical 
that the arguer will attempt to anticipate and defuse such objections within the course of 
the argument.  If the arguer does not deal with the objections and criticisms, then to that 
degree, the argument is not going to satisfy the dictates of rationality; more precisely, to 
that very degree the argument falls short of what is required in terms of structure—never 
mind the content; that is, the adequacy of the response to those objections.  For those at 
whom it is directed, those who know and care about the issue, will be aware that the 
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argument is open to objections from those who disagree with its reasons, conclusion, and-
or reasoning.  Hence, if the arguer wishes to persuade Others rationally, the arguer is 
obligated to take account of those objections and opposing points of view.  To ignore 
them, not to mention them, or to suppress them—these could hardly be considered the 
moves of someone engaged in the process of rational persuasion; thus, the process of 
persuasion must include a second—dialectical—tier in which objections and criticism are 
dealt with (Johnson 2000a, 160; cf. Johnson 2000a, 165). 
 
This is a plausible argument, but I should like to point out that there are two, and not just 
one, final premises: the claim that the purpose of the argument is rational persuasion, and the 
claim that the process of argumentation occurs in a context of controversy.  And the latter claim 
is both crucial and independent of the first.  But as John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, ch. 2, par. 23; 
1965, 286) pointed out, in Euclidean geometry rational persuasion is achieved with just the 
illative tier, without any need of dealing with objections.  Hence, the dialectical tier is not a 
consequence of just the telos of rational persuasion, but of this telos plus the controversial origin 
of argumentation. 
In other words, Johnson gives the impression that the third reason of the illative tier of his 
argument for the dialectical conception of argument is the telos of rational persuasion.  This 
impression is misleading because if this reason were the only premise it would be insufficient 
and because in fact Johnson himself combines it with the premise about controversial origin. 
I suspect that Johnson’s reaction to this criticism would be to insist that controversy is 
presupposed by all argumentation and to regard geometrical proofs as not arguments but mere 
inferences or entailments.  This move would strike me as arbitrary insofar as Euclidean 
geometrical proofs are typically attempts to persuade oneself or others of the truth of the theorem 
in question by rational means.  Moreover, the move would be questionable from the point of 
view of Johnson’s own principle of vulnerability because the restriction of the domain to that of 
controversial situations tends to make the conclusion true by definition; that is, the dialectical tier 
becomes necessary as an immediate consequence of the controversial context.  Then this third 
reason of Johnson’s illative tier would basically reduce to his second reason. 
I believe the way to remedy this difficulty would be to revise the conclusion of Johnson’s 
argument by weakening the requirement of the dialectical tier.  For example, instead of being 
regarded as a necessary condition to have an argument, the dialectical tier might be regarded as a 
sufficient condition.  This would amount to replacing the conjunctive version of the dialectical 
conception with the disjunctive one mentioned earlier. 
 
 
5.  Johnson’s Argument: Its Criticism of Alternative Positions 
 
So far we have examined the illative tier of Johnson’s argument for his dialectical 
conception of argument.  We have identified, analyzed, evaluated, and criticized three supporting 
reasons.  Let us now go on to examine the dialectical tier of his argument.  This tier consists of 
two parts, criticism of the alternative traditional conception of argument, and explicit replies to 
explicit objections to his definition.  The criticism of alternatives can be easily subsumed under 
the notion of reply to objections, by regarding that criticism as a reply to the objection that the 
traditional conception of argument is adequate (and constitutes an alternative to the dialectical 
conception);15 but it is useful to treat the two parts separately, as Johnson does explicitly in his 
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book. 
Let us begin with a criticism which I have implicitly already examined and so can be 
dealt with relatively briefly.  According to Johnson, “argument has its structure (reasons in 
support of a thesis, or premises plus conclusion) because of the purpose it serves—rational 
persuasion.  A significant limitation of the structural view is that it ignores this important 
aspect—purpose or function.  The moral of the story is that if a satisfactory conceptualization of 
argument is to be developed, the purpose or function of the discourse must be referred to” 
(Johnson 2000a, 148, cf. 167).  But earlier I pointed out that, although the purely abstract version 
of the traditional definition does lack any teleological aspect, the illative conception (such as 
Copi’s) is teleological insofar as it does make the aim of argument the justification of the 
conclusion by means of supporting reasons. Although justification is indeed different from 
persuasion, this only means that the illative conception attributes to argument a purpose different 
from the purpose attributed to it by Johnson’s dialectical conception.  Now, this conception (and 
even the rhetorical one) may very well be correct that the purpose is persuasion, and the illative 
conception incorrect that it is justification, but it seems unfair to criticize the latter for conceiving 
argument as purely structural without function. 
A second criticism advanced by Johnson (2000a, 147) is that “the traditional view … 
must ultimately fail because it does not distinguish argument from other forms of reasoning.”  He 
discusses three problematic forms of reasoning: explaining, instructing, and making an excuse.  
This criticism would be relevant and strong if this claim of confusion were true.  But it is not.  
An analysis of Johnson’s supporting critical argument will show this. 
Johnson (2000a, 146) says, “I offer reasons in support when I explain, ‘The reason that 
your car won’t start is that you have a dead battery, and also the starter is defective’.  Here I am 
supporting one claim (your car won’t start) by another (you have a dead battery) and another 
(your starter is defective).”  This example and others given by Johnson involve a misconception 
of the notion of support used by the illative definition.  In this example, the supporting reasons 
are not the ones mentioned but rather the observational reports (not mentioned) that after turning 
the ignition key nothing happened; the mentioned reasons are the causes offered to explain the 
observed fact.  Correspondingly, in the quoted text, the claim that your car won’t start does not 
function as a conclusion but rather as a presupposition or premise of an argument aiming to 
support the causal claim. 
Besides this misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the notion of support used by the 
illative conception, Johnson’s critical argument may involve an equivocation on the term reason.  
Admittedly a reason can mean a premise helping to establish a controversial conclusion in an 
argument, or it can mean a cause or explanation helping to account for why a given non-
controversial claim is true.  So it would be correct to say that one offers reasons when one 
explains, in one sense of reasons, but not that one offers reasons in support when one explains.  
Thus, here it may be the critic (and not the proponent of the illative view) who is failing to 
distinguish argument from explanation. 
Johnson’s remarks about the other forms of reasoning suffer from similar difficulties.  He 
says, “I offer reasons when I instruct, ‘If you want to get the best light for this shot, you are 
going to have to use a XDX-1000 filter combined with …’  Here I offer a reason (you are going 
to have to use a XDX-1000 filter) as support for the claim (if you want to get the best lighting), 
but the function of the discourse is not to persuade anyone that the claim is true” (Johnson 2000a, 
146).  Once again, there is no relationship of illative support between the two clauses, and there 
are not even two distinct claims; rather we have a single claim about a means-end connection 
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between two things. 
Johnson (2000a, 146) also says that “I offer reasons when I make an excuse, ‘I can’t go to 
the show tonight because I have to study for my exam tomorrow’.  Here we have the structure of 
an argument as defined, but that is not sufficient to qualify it as an argument.”  I would counter 
that here we are in the domain of motivation, which is subsumable under the general concept of 
explanation, although it is also useful to treat it as an important special case.  That is, one 
meaning of reason is that of motivation for an action.  Clearly the quoted example is an 
explanation (of the speaker’s not going), not an argument trying to persuade anybody that the 
speaker is not going.  But this is an interpretation reached in the light of the illative conception, 
which clearly has the resources to say that the need to study is the motivating reason why one is 
not going, not the evidence proving that one is not going. 
A third criticism advanced by Johnson is really a particular case of the second but 
deserves separate discussion and special attention.  It claims that the illative conception 
presupposes an inadequate conception of a particular kind of reasoning, namely inference.  This 
inadequacy has three overlapping aspects.  First, the illative conception tends to conflate three 
forms of reasoning that ought to be distinguished, namely implication, inference, and argument 
(Johnson 2000a, 93-95).  Second, it conceives the illative core in terms of a model that ought to 
be discarded, namely what Johnson calls “the (P+I) model, the view that an argument should be 
seen as consisting of a set of premises, plus an inference from them to the conclusion.  The 
inference is typically represented as a bridge or a link from the premises to the conclusion” 
(Johnson 2000a, 166-67).  Third, it fails to properly distinguish between argument and inference 
(Johnson 2000a, 177-78). 
Much of this criticism is insightful and raises important issues.  The key merit is to point 
out that the illative conception of argument has not been embedded in a wider theory of 
reasoning that would define, distinguish, and interrelate such concepts as reasoning, argument, 
inference, implication, and explanation.  However, the effectiveness of this criticism is limited 
by the fact that the dialectical conception of argument, or more generally, Johnson’s own 
pragmatic theory of argument, has also not been embedded within a more comprehensive theory 
of reasoning.  He himself constantly reminds us that the aim of a theory of argument is more 
narrow than that of a theory of reasoning, and that while the articulation of a theory of reasoning 
remains a desirable goal, it was not within the scope of his work on the theory of argument.  
Thus the crucial question is whether the theory of reasoning groped toward or adumbrated by 
Johnson’s dialectical conception is more adequate than that presupposed by the traditional 
illative conception. 
With this aim in mind, I would point out some inadequacies in Johnson’s account, 
besides the ones discussed in connection with the previous criticism involving the relationship 
between argument, support, reasoning, and explanation (which would also be relevant to the 
present point).  Johnson (2000a, 94) defines implication as “a logical relationship between 
statements or propositions, in which one follows necessarily from the others”; and he gives the 
following paradigm example: if it is true that if P then Q and that if Q then R, then it is true that 
if P then R.  He gives this definition and illustration in a passage where he also defines and 
illustrates inference and argument, with the aim of showing how to distinguish and interrelate 
these three forms of reasoning.  However, it seems to me that implication so defined is not a 
form of reasoning at all; it is an abstraction and not a form of mental activity.  He is not defining 
implication as what might be called deductive reasoning, which instead is subsumed under his 
definition of inference as a special case; instead he is defining implication in a way that places it 
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outside the domain of reasoning altogether. 
In another passage, where he focuses merely on the distinction between inference and 
argument, he seems to come close to placing argument itself outside the domain of reasoning.  In 
a summary extolling the advantages of the pragmatic approach, he says that one of these 
advantages is that “we can begin to get a handle on differentiating between arguments and 
inference.  Arguments, as I have shown, are outcomes within the practice that are dialectical in 
nature and characterized by manifest rationality.  What is an inference?  In chapter 4, I presented 
inference as in one important sense something that happens in the mind, an activity perhaps 
spontaneous, perhaps calculated, by which the mind moves from one thought to another” 
(Johnson 2000a, 177-78).  After pointing some similarities, he stresses the following difference: 
“an inference can be what it is while remaining within the mind of the inferrer; this is not true of 
argument.  One way of drawing this contrast is to say that inferring is monolectical, whereas 
arguing is a dialectical process.  Moreover, argument must be seen within the practice of 
argumentation, but no comparable requirement exists for inference” (Johnson 2000a, 177-78).  
The only point I want to make here is that by conceiving an argument as a dialectical process that 
subsists within the practice of argumentation and cannot remain within the mind of the arguer, 
Johnson seems to be saying that argument is not a form of reasoning; to be sure it originates in 
reasoning, but to become argument it has to metamorphosize into non-reasoning.  Now, all this 
may be adequate, sound, and correct from various points of view, but it is clear that we need 
more than a theory of reasoning; the theory of argument would need to be embedded in 
something like a theory of action, or a theory of speech acts, or a theory of social interaction. 
There is at least one other criticism which Johnson advances against the illative 
conception, namely its “failure to give an adequate representation of the dialectical character of 
argumentation” (Johnson 2000a, 165).  I hesitate to include this point under the heading of 
criticism of alternatives, in the dialectical tier of Johnson’s own argument; for there seems to be 
some circularity or question-begging in objecting to a position P by saying that it fails to describe 
the matter at hand the way its alternative Q does; in fact this failure is guaranteed by P’s being an 
alternative to Q and is an immediate consequence of that fact.  In short, to point out this sort of 
thing is part of the clarification or elucidation of the two positions.  However, Johnson is explicit 
that he regards this as a “limitation” of the traditional conception of argument, and so it deserves 
some attention.  Moreover, it will turn out that the examination of this criticism is useful from a 
methodological, meta-logical, or meta-theoretical point of view. 
As one might expect, to justify this criticism Johnson elaborates an argument trying to 
show that arguments must have a dialectical tier.  But this argument is and can only be one of the 
positive reasons supporting his dialectical conception; that is, one of the elements of the illative 
tier of his argument.  In fact, he repeats the third reason discussed above, namely the one trying 
to establish that the telos rational persuasion implies the necessity of the dialectical tier.  Clearly, 
here I need not repeat my own criticism of that reason.  Instead, I want to elaborate a meta-
theoretical point. 
I want to stress that a positive reason of the illative tier has become a critical reason of the 
dialectical tier.  I believe this could always happen.  In fact, consider the illative tier R-1 through 
R-n of an argument whose conclusion is P; and consider that part of the dialectical tier consisting 
of various criticisms C-1 through C-n of alternative Q.  Now, if and insofar as any one 
supporting reason is relevant and sufficient, then it would be more or less true to say that, for 
example, if R-n is true then P is also true.  Moreover, if and insofar as the various criticisms are 
cogent, then it would be approximately correct to claim that, for example, if C-n is true then Q is 
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false; indeed any particular criticism of Q can be phrased in this manner, for that is what makes it 
a criticism.  Next, note that the fact that P and Q are alternatives means that they are at least 
contraries (though they need not be contradictories), so that, for example, if P is true then Q is 
false.  Finally, putting together the three claims expressed in my last three sentences, we get that 
if R-n is true then Q is false, and hence that R-n is a criticism of Q; but R-n was one of the 
supporting reasons in the illative core, and so any such reason can generate a criticism in the 
dialectical tier. 
My final comment here is that not all criticisms of alternatives are or need be dialectical 
rephrasings of illative supporting reasons.  For example, Johnson’s first three criticisms are not 
like that.  Thus in discharging one’s own dialectical obligations, it seems important to distinguish 
between criticisms that are independent of the illative tier and criticisms that are not.  Only the 
independent criticisms would seem to add anything new to the argument, whereas the dependent 
ones may be useful rhetorically or pedagogically but add little to the logical strength of the 
argument.  And this was the methodological, meta-theoretical lesson I wanted to elaborate. 
 
 
6.  Johnson’s Argument: Replies to Objections   
 
I have been analyzing Johnson’s argument in favor of the dialectical conception in light 
of his own definition.  To complete the analysis there remains to examine the second part of its 
dialectical tier, consisting of his explicit replies to objections.  In his book Manifest Rationality, 
he lists, numbers, and discusses five objections. 
The first objection (Johnson 2000a, 169-71) is that the definition is too restrictive because 
it disqualifies from the category of arguments discourses that lack a dialectical tier.  Johnson’s 
reply is that his definition is indeed restrictive insofar as it does imply this disqualification, but it 
is not excessively restrictive because this restriction is quite proper.  The restriction is proper 
because it focuses attention on the paradigm and central instances of argument, rather than on the 
derivative cases that might be called “proto-arguments.” 
My criticism of this reply is that Johnson’s definition is indeed too restrictive because the 
desired redirection of focus can be accomplished equally well by the moderate, disjunctive 
version of the dialectical conception.  Recall that that conception states that an argument is an 
attempt to justify a conclusion that gives reasons in support of it and/or defends it from 
objections. 
The second objection (Johnson 2000a, 171-73) is that the dialectical tier is unnecessary in 
the definition of argument because the work it does could be accomplished in other ways: for 
example, one could make the dialectical tier part of the normative requirements of a good 
argument;16 or part of the definition of such more complex discourses as extended arguments, or 
cases, or supplementary arguments, or full-fledged arguments, and the like, as distinct from mere 
arguments or ordinary arguments.  Johnson’s reply is that the first criticism would have 
difficulties distinguishing between arguments that are bad insofar as they lack a dialectical tier, 
and arguments that are bad insofar as their dialectical tier fails to reply effectively to objections.  
Similarly, the second criticism would lead to the question, when is it enough to give an ordinary 
argument and when is it necessary to present an extended argument? 
I agree that it is important to distinguish between the factual existence of a dialectical tier 
and the evaluative adequacy of it, and so it may be impossible to go through with the suggestion 
that the question of the dialectical tier belongs wholly to the theory of assessment, and can be 
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removed from the theoretical problem of definition.  However, regarding extended, 
supplementary, or full-fledged arguments, I do not see any difficulty, and that part of this 
objection seems to me to reinforce the moderate, disjunctive definition. 
The third objection is that the definition is circular because it defines argument in terms 
of argumentation, among other things (Johnson 2000a, 173; cf. Hitchcock 2002a, 289).  Johnson 
replies by admitting that there is a slight circularity, but claiming that the circularity is not 
vicious or objectionable.  I agree with him, in part because I would add that the reference to 
argumentation is not necessary.  In fact, my formulation of the three versions of the dialectical 
conception avoids such reference, without I believe any loss of generality, at least from the point 
of view of the contrast between the illative and the dialectical conceptions. 
However, another comment is in order.  Even if we eliminate mention of argumentation 
in the wording of the dialectical conception of argument, this eliminates only a potential internal 
circularity; but this does not avoid what might be called a potential external circularity, that is a 
circularity in the justification of the definitional claim.  In fact, we saw earlier that one of 
Johnson’s supporting reasons in the illative tier of his argument was the one based on the nature 
of the process of arguing; that that argument could be criticized as begging the question; that that 
criticism could be answered only by making a revision in the definition; and that the revision was 
to broaden the concept to include justifications that did not aim at rational persuasion but at 
conceptual clarification. 
The fourth objection is that the definition is not novel because it is similar to that 
advanced by Stephen Toulmin, who used the notion of rebuttal (Johnson 2000a, 173-74; cf. 
Toulmin 1958, 101).  Johnson replies that his definition is indeed similar to Toulmin’s, but has 
some novelty insofar as it is a generalization of it.  I agree that Johnson’s definition has 
considerable originality, vis-à-vis Toulmin’s.  Thus, we might say that the objection is false.  
However, I believe another issue needs to be raised here. 
That is, is this objection relevant?  And if it is, why is it relevant?  Neither the dialectical 
nor the illative conception of argument says anything about novelty.  Nor do the traditional or 
Johnson’s theories of assessment.  In particular, his definition speaks of the truth of the 
conclusion, and it is the conclusion’s truth that needs to be supported with reasons and 
dialectically defended from objections; it is not the conclusion’s novelty or originality.  In short, 
if this fourth objection were true, namely, if Johnson’s definitional conclusion were not novel, 
why would that be a problem?  I do not have an answer to this question, although my intuition 
tells me that such an objection is relevant, that novelty is important, and so that this is an 
important question. 
The fifth and last objection discussed in Johnson’s book is that the problem addressed by 
the definition is one of “just semantics” (Johnson 2000a, 174-75) because the word argument has 
many meanings, and so it is arbitrary to choose or invent one particular meaning.  Johnson 
replies that although the problem motivating the definition is in a sense semantical, it is not “just 
semantics” in the sense of being unimportant.  In the course of his reply, Johnson probably 
admits too much when he concedes some force to this objection and declares that his conception 
is a stipulative definition.  For as Hansen (2002, 272-73) has argued and as Johnson himself 
(2002a, 313-14) later admitted, Johnson’s thesis is really a theoretical definition; that is, a claim 
that is part of a theory of argument aiming to provide concepts and principles for the 
identification, understanding, interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and criticism of arguments. 
Besides these replies to these five objections, contained in the book Manifest Rationality, 
since the book was published several scholars have advanced other objections and Johnson has 
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replied to them (Govier 1998, 1999b, 2000; Groarke 2002; Hansen 2002; Hitchcock 2002a; Leff 
2000; Tindale 2002; Rees 2001; Wyatt 2001; cf. Johnson 2002a, forthcoming).  Thus a complete 
account or an extended discussion of Johnson’s argument would have to include these additional 
objections and replies.  However, my aim here is theoretical rather than historical, and so my 
discussion of them here will be guided by their relevance to the problem under discussion, 
namely the nature and adequacy of the dialectical approach in general vis-à-vis the non-
dialectical approach, and in particular the relative merits of the illative and dialectical 
conceptions of argument. 
To begin with, some of objections raised after publication had been anticipated by 
Johnson.  This applies to the objections that his definition is too restrictive, that the dialectical 
tier is unnecessary, and that the definition is circular.  However, needless to say, after the book’s 
publication, new nuances and clarifications have emerged from these discussions. 
In regard to other objections, I wish to reiterate something I stated at the beginning of this 
paper.  That is, when I introduced the dialectical conception of argument (section 2), I first gave 
my own formulation, and then I quoted Johnson’s definition as an illustration.  I also claimed 
that in giving my own formulation, I had attempted to incorporate the most important 
clarifications and most telling objections that had emerged from post-publication discussions.  
One example will have to suffice. 
Both Hansen (2002, 269-70) and Hitchcock (2002a, 289) have independently objected 
that Johnson’s definition, as he words it, states or implies that to be an argument (at least in the 
paradigm sense of the concept) a discourse must contain all (and not just some of) the reasons 
that support the conclusion; plus only those reasons that actually support it, as contrasted to those 
that are intended to support it; plus replies to all objections and criticisms, and not just to some; 
and only actual replies, rather that attempted replies.  Thus, they have suggested that when 
Johnson says that an argument presents “the reasons that support it [the conclusion]” (Johnson 
2000a, 168) the definition should instead speak of “reasons in support of the conclusion” or 
“reasons that attempt to support the conclusion.”  And when he says that in the argument’s 
dialectical tier “the arguer discharges his dialectical obligations” (Johnson 2000a, 168), the 
definition should instead say that the arguer attempts to discharge some dialectical obligations. 
These revisions also take care of the infinite-regress objection advanced by Govier (1998, 
8; 1999b, 232-37).  This is the objection that if all arguments must have a dialectical tier, then a 
reply to an objection must also have a dialectical tier, since such a reply is or should be an 
argument; thus, a reply to an objection to the original conclusion must contain replies to the 
objections to the reply, and so on ad infinitum.  Johnson’s best reply to this objection involves 
“pointing out the parallel between the illative core and the dialectical tier.  That is, the same line 
of reasoning that prevents an infinite regress in the illative core can also be deployed to prevent 
the exfoliation of the dialectical tier” (Johnson forthcoming, section 3a). 
Johnson does not elaborate.  I suppose what he has in mind is the following traditional 
difficulty: if an argument must have an illative tier containing “the” reasons that support the 
conclusion, it must contain not only all the reasons that directly support it (which is already an 
indefinitely long process), but it must also contain all the lower-level reasons that directly 
support those direct reasons and so indirectly support the original conclusion; but such indirect 
reasons must themselves be supported by further reasons, and so on ad infinitum.  This well 
known infinite regress is usually stopped by saying that the illative tier need contain only those 
reasons that seem appropriate in the given context. 
The situation with the dialectical tier is analogous: one replies only to those objections 
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that seem appropriate in the context.  At the level of the formulation of the definition of 
argument, elimination of the definite article I believe does the trick: if we say that an argument is 
an attempt at justification which gives reasons in support of a conclusion or defends it from 
objections, this clearly means that it gives one or more reasons in support of the conclusion 
and/or defends it from one or more objections. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion: A Moderately Dialectical Conception 
 
To recapitulate, Johnson’s argument for the dialectical conception of argument is 
complex and multi-faceted.  It has an illative tier that advances at least three supporting reasons: 
empirical support reminiscent of an inductive generalization; the argument from the nature of the 
process of arguing; and the argument from the telos of rational persuasion.  Johnson’s argument 
also has a dialectical tier consisting of two main parts, criticism of alternatives and replies to 
objections.  He criticizes the traditional conception of argument in at least four ways: that it 
conceives argument as having structure but no function; that it fails to distinguish argument from 
other forms of reasoning, especially explanation; that it presupposes an inadequate conception of 
inference; and that it fails to give an adequate account of the dialectical nature of argumentation.  
Furthermore, he replies to at least six objections that allege the following charges: excessive 
narrowness of scope, dispensability of the dialectical tier, vicious circularity, lack of novelty vis-
à-vis Toulmin, triviality beyond semantical issues, and infinite regress. 
In light of this interpretation, reconstruction, and analysis of Johnson’s argument, it is 
obvious that it satisfies its own definition.  And given the stringent requirements of this 
definition, this satisfaction represents a considerable merit.  In the course of my discussion, I 
have also assessed, evaluated, and criticized that argument.  It would be too tedious to 
recapitulate these assessments, but it is important to point out that they have been partly 
negative, unfavorable, and destructive, and partly  positive, favorable, and constructive.  That is, 
they have been partly critical (in the ordinary sense of criticism connoting negativity), and partly 
critical in Johnson’s (2000a, 217-23) own sense (connoting fruitful constructiveness).  To add a 
further dimension to such constructiveness and to try to provide a synthetic overview of the 
forest after our long journey through its trees, I would suggest that the upshot of my assessments 
is that Johnson’s argument is cogent insofar as it justifies the following thesis, and implausible 
otherwise.  The thesis is the claim that an argument is an attempt to justify a conclusion by 
giving reasons in support of it or defending it from objections. 
I further claim that this is a moderately dialectical conception and that I have provided an 
argument in favor of this conception.  A question now arises.  What kind of argument have I 
provided?  Is it self-referentially consistent?  That is, does my argument fit my own definition?  
Is my argument an instance of its own conclusion?  I believe it is.  It may be viewed primarily as 
a defense of this moderately dialectical conception by means of criticism of Johnson’s alternative 
strongly dialectical conception.  Such a defense would suffice to make it an argument (in the 
sense of the moderate definition), even though it is obvious that I have not explicitly defended 
the moderate conception from the other alternatives, namely the hyper dialectical, the illative, the 
rhetorical, and the purely abstract conception.  But I have presumed that in the present context no 
such defense was needed.  If this is correct, this point would further reinforce the moderate 
conception.  On the other hand, my initial remarks about the dialogical model of argument may 
be seen as an explicit, if summative and sketchy, defense of the same moderate conclusion from 
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the dialogue model.   
Moreover, although my moderately dialectical conception of argument does not require 
every argument to possess an illative tier, my argument may be taken to have such a tier, 
consisting of two supporting reasons.  One is provided by my interpretation, reconstruction, and 
appropriation of Goldman’s truth-in-evidence argument; the other consists of my suggested 
replacement for Johnson’s empirical argument, namely my more systematic version based on the 
data base from Galileo’s Dialogue. 
Finally, does my argument include replies to objections?  I have already pointed out that 
the criticism of an alternative can be conceived as a reply to the objection that there is no reason 
to prefer the given conclusion to the alternative.  This link is of course what enables my previous 
considerations to instantiate the moderately dialectical conception of argument.  Furthermore, 
incidentally and in passing, these considerations also contain replies to possible objections.  I 
would have to admit, however, that so far I have not presented explicit replies to explicit 
objections.  I can also say that I welcome objections, although I do so with some hesitation.  In 
fact, such welcoming leads to a paradox.17
The arguer’s welcoming of objections is certainly important.  And Johnson (2000a, 161, 
165) has written eloquent words in this regard.  But if this open-mindedness is to be more than a 
desirable psychological trait, one would have to say that a good argument should elicit 
objections; indeed that an argument is good (in part) if and insofar as it generates objections.  An 
argument should not fall on dead ears; if it does, more than being a sign of its conclusiveness, it 
is probably a sign of its sterility.  Of course, to be really good, an argument should also have the 
resources to answer or refute subsequent objections.  So it is not really the existence of 
objections or the possibility of generating them that adds value to an argument.  It is its ability to 
elicit refutable, implausible, or invalid objections.  It is these that I welcome with open arms. 
To encourage this process, I end by volunteering some of these objections myself.  The 
first one may be formulated as follows.  It is undeniable that there is a difference between the 
conjunctive and the disjunctive dialectical conceptions: it is one thing to say that an argument is 
an attempt to make a conclusion acceptable by means of both reasons in support of it and replies 
to objections; and it is another to say that an argument is an attempt to make a conclusion 
acceptable by means of either reasons in support of it or replies to objections.  But this is a very 
small difference: sub specie aeternitatis, they are both dialectical conceptions; and even in the 
less Olympic earlier presentation of various conceptions of argument, both of these conceptions 
were treated as special cases of the dialectical conception and were regarded as having much 
more in common than they had differences, especially vis-à-vis the various versions of the 
traditional conception.  So it is unclear what all the fuss is about; the difference is so minor as to 
approach triviality. 
My reply to this objection is that even the eternal gods who view these matters from 
Olympus need to cultivate their powers of discrimination and their ability to make fine 
distinctions.  So there is no good reason to ignore the difference between conjunction and 
inclusive disjunction.  The important point is that differences should not be magnified or 
exaggerated, but the other side of this coin is that they should not be minimized or underplayed.  
However, such balance has been precisely what I have stressed in this essay, by beginning to 
point out that these two definitions were versions of the dialectical approach, and by ending with 
the conclusion that the disjunctive conception seems to be preferable to the conjunctive one. 
A second objection one could raise is a criticism from the point of view of that I have 
called the hyper dialectical conception.  This is the view that an argument is a defense of its 
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conclusion from actual or potential objections.  From the point of view of the hyper conception, 
the moderate definition is a step in a direction opposite to what is needed: presumably one should 
further strengthen Johnson’s strong conception rather than weakening it into the moderate 
conception.  And the important reason to take a step toward the hyper conception is the 
following: given any claim that has been asserted, one could always raise the question, what 
reasons if any there are in support of the claim.  This question may be regarded as the prime or 
minimal objection to any claim.  If one anticipates it, one constructs the illative tier and gives the 
supporting reasons even before the objection has actually been raised.  Or one can wait until after 
the objection has been explicitly raised.  In either case, the illative component can be interpreted 
as a part of the dialectical tier. 
To answer this objection, I would begin by pointing out that if it cannot be satisfactorily 
answered, then I for one would have no difficulty with revising my conclusion by modifying the 
moderate into the hyper conception.  But before resorting to this revision, I would want to try the 
following reply.  That is, in a way analogous to how this objection attempts to interpret the 
illative component in terms of the dialectical tier, one can perhaps try to do the reverse and 
reinterpret the dialectical tier in terms of the illative component. 
Consider an argument whose illative component consists of premises P-1 though P-n and 
conclusion C.  And suppose the argument also has a dialectical tier with objections O-1 through 
O-k, respectively answered by replies R-1 through R-k.  Now consider the conjunction of an 
objection and its corresponding reply, (O-j & R-j), or some appropriately reworded phrasing of it 
that might be needed for grammatical propriety.  It seems to me that such a conjunction would 
constitute a reason supporting the conclusion C.  It would be like saying that one reason for 
accepting the conclusion is that if one objects to it in such and such a way, such an objection 
would be incorrect; or collectively considered, one reason for accepting conclusion C is that all 
objections against it fail, i.e. that there are no objections to it.  In other words, an objection to a 
conclusion C may be seen as a reason against it, a reason for claiming not-C; and if a reason R 
for not-C is a bad reason, then the claim that R is a bad reason for not-C, may be seen as a reason 
for C.  Of course, such a reason would not be a conclusive reason, and to claim such 
conclusiveness would be to commit a damaging version of the fallacy from ignorance; indeed I 
have already suggested that for conclusiveness or deductive validity, the question of objections 
does not even arise.  But we are clearly dealing with reasons that, however strong, fall short of 
conclusiveness, and for such cases the explicit refutation of an explicit objection may be viewed 
as a supporting reason. 
The upshot of these considerations is that while the presentation of supporting reasons 
may be regarded as a reply to a weak or minimal objection, the refutation of objections may be 
regarded as a weak or minimal supporting reason.  There thus seems to be a symmetry between 
the illative and the dialectical tiers, and this is perhaps another reason for giving them separate 
mention in the definition of argument, as the disjunctive conception does. 
A third objection to my argument involves Johnson’s notion of manifest rationality, by 
which he means the attempt to not only be rational, but also to look and appear rational.  The 
objection would allege that in my reconstruction of his argument I have ignored the following 
element of its illative tier: that an argument must have a dialectical tier because “argumentation 
[is] more than just an exercise in rationality” (Johnson 2000a, 163), it is also an exercise in 
manifest rationality; and “manifest rationality is why the arguer is obligated to respond to 
objections and criticisms from others” (Johnson 2000a, 163-64).  This argument is hard to miss 
since it is being referred to in the title of Johnson’s book; since it is given in the body of the work 
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when the idea of manifest rationality is explicitly discussed (Johnson 2000a, 163-64); and since 
elsewhere (Johnson 2000b, 3) he explicitly presents it as an additional line of justification, 
besides the argument from the telos of rational persuasion.  Moreover, the argument is apparently 
important because if it is cogent it would justify the strongly dialectical conception of argument, 
but not the moderate definition. 
My response to this objection starts with a criticism of the argument from manifest 
rationality.  In regard to its premise that argument is an exercise in manifest rationality, it may be 
deemed acceptable, but I do wonder whether its acceptability exceeds that of the conclusion.  
Moreover, I agree that the premise is more or less relevant, but I question whether it is sufficient.  
One reason for questioning its sufficiency is that, as we saw in the case of the argument from the 
telos of rational persuasion, an additional interdependent premise is needed, namely a 
proposition about the controversial origin of argumentation; otherwise, as proofs in Euclidean 
geometry suggest, rationality can be achieved without replying to objections. 
A more specific and important reason for questioning the sufficiency of the present 
premise of manifest rationality is that it is unclear that it really adds anything to the argument 
from the telos of rational persuasion.  Johnson’s key point here seems to be that whereas 
rationality as such might be taken to require that one answer only objections that are really 
relevant, manifest rationality requires that one answer objections that appear to be relevant, even 
if in reality they are not.  But I would point out that the inclusion of apparent, as distinct from 
real objections, is required by the telos of rational persuasion, for it would not be persuasive to 
neglect objections that are believed (even if incorrectly) to be forceful.  In other words, in 
Johnson’s own account the two operative notions are manifest rationality and rational 
persuasion, and these seem to me to be two sides of the same coin, rather than two distinct 
concepts.  Although similar considerations have led Hitchcock and Hansen18 to conclude that 
Johnson’s notion of manifest rationality is rhetorical after all, my own conclusion here is that this 
argument from manifest rationality has no force above and beyond the argument from the telos 
of rational persuasion. 
There is another conclusion I would want to draw.  I originally did not include this 
supporting reason in my reconstruction of the illative tier of Johnson’s argument because I 
judged it to be devoid of the additional force just mentioned.  In doing so, I was operating, I 
believe, from the point of view of strict rationality, as distinct from manifest rationality.  I was 
telling myself that, appearances to the contrary, and despite Johnson’s own explicit statements to 
the contrary, he really had no distinct argument; so also using the principle of charity, I decided 
it was better to neglect these considerations, rather than interpreting them as an argument and 
then criticizing the argument as worthless.  In that sense and to that extent, my previous neglect 
was justified, and hence the present objection has no force. 
However, in discussing this objection now, I was taking the point of view of manifest 
rationality at the metalevel.  That is, given all the appearances (at the object level) that manifest 
rationality is one of Johnson’s reasons in support of the dialectical tier, I explored whether these 
appearances correspond to reality; whether this reason, besides being meant to support his 
conclusion, does really support it.  If and insofar as my doing so has added to the persuasive 
force of my own argument, then perhaps I have come closer to achieving my present aim of 
rationally persuading you that the moderate conception is preferable.  Furthermore, such rational 
persuasion has perhaps been enhanced by the fact that I explicitly included at least one objection 
which for me did not have even prima facie plausibility, but which might be plausibly advanced 
by Johnson or anyone taking his point of view; and this in turn may be taken to enhance the 
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practical value of manifest rationality, practical in the sense of the practice of argumentation, 
even if it remains true, as I would hold, that theoretically speaking manifest rationality is an 
aspect of rational persuasion. 
A final objection now comes to mind.  It is one from the point of view of the illative 
conception, and it is based on my criticism of Johnson’s criticism of this conception.  That is, if 
it is inaccurate to object, as Johnson does, that the illative conception lacks a teleological aspect 
and fails to attribute a telos to argument; and if it is inaccurate or unfair to object that the illative 
conception fails to properly distinguish between argument and other forms of reasoning such as 
explanation and inference; and if it is circular to object that the illative conception ignores the 
dialectical nature of argument; then does it not seem that the illative conception can survive 
Johnson’s criticism, and is perhaps adequate?  In other words, even if my critique of Johnson’s 
illative tier and of his explicit replies to explicit objections shows that my moderate conception is 
preferable to his strong one, it does not show that the moderate conception is superior to the 
illative definition, especially when we recall my criticism of Johnson’s criticism of the illative 
conception.  Does not my argument need one other component, namely a criticism of the 
alternative illative position? 
Part of my answer to this objection lies in stressing two arguments discussed earlier: my 
reconstruction or appropriation of what I have called Goldman’s truth-in-evidence argument and 
of what I have called Johnson’s empirical inductive generalization.  Insofar as they support my 
moderate version of the dialectical conception, they do not support the illative conception.  I 
would also want to exploit my claim about the symmetry of the illative and dialectical tiers; 
insofar as that claim is correct, it suggests that even if the illative conception were otherwise 
acceptable, the moderately dialectical re-description of the situation would be more 
encompassing and therefore better. 
And this suggests that perhaps the best line of defense here is to question whether the 
illative definition of argument is really an alternative to the moderately dialectical conception.  
One reason to see that they are not really alternatives is to stress that the moderately dialectical 
definition as I phrased it and am defending it here at the end of my discussion speaks of 
justification rather than persuasion.  This is a revision of the dialectical conception required by 
the difficulties that emerged when I discussed Johnson’s argument from the nature of the process 
of arguing; that argument could not be regarded as a successful attempt at persuasion (since from 
the point of view of persuasion it may be begging the question), but it was better regarded as a 
justification (insofar as it is an analytical conceptual elucidation in the context of theorizing).  
This move from persuasion to justification raises the question of the precise relationship between 
these two notions, but this issue cannot be elaborated here; suffice it to say that I conceive 
justification partly as a weakening of the notion of proof, and partly as a requirement for rational 
persuasion.  Thus my moderate conception incorporates an element of the illative definition. 
To be sure they are not identical, but they are not inconsistent either.  In a sense, the 
illative conception entails the moderately dialectical one, since the latter is a disjunction of which 
the former is the first disjunct.  But although this entailment ensures their formal consistency, it 
perhaps points in a misleading direction because it suggests that the moderate conception is a 
special case of the illative one, whereas the opposite is more nearly correct.  That is, the 
moderate conception is more general than the illative one, in the sense that it can subsume under 
itself all the particular instances that the illative conception subsumes, plus others that the illative 
conception does not subsume.  If then, the proper relationship between the moderately dialectical 
and the illative conceptions is not one of competition or inconsistency, but rather compatibility 
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or species and genus, then in arguing for the moderately dialectical conception one need not 
reject the illative definition, but one should rather incorporate it. 
In short, the moderately dialectical conception of argument may be seen as a synthesis of 
the illative conception and of the strongly dialectical definition.  And if the latter two alternatives 
are dubbed thesis and antithesis, then I may be allowed to end my analysis on this dialectical 
note.  Of course such an ending is dialectical in a sense that is perhaps not in accordance with 
some people’s idea of dialectics, but it is nevertheless suggestive of further work needed to 






                                                 
1 The increasing strength of this trend may be seen from the fact that we have now seen the 
emergence of articles that attribute “dialectical” thinking to scholars whom one would not have 
expected to be so regarded, for example, Hilary Putnam; cf. Cummins 2002.  And the trend is not 
only international, but also inter-linguistic, as one may gather from Cattani 2001. 
 
2 For a good, brief, and instructive example of translation of monological problems into 
dialogical terminology, see Krabbe 1998.  
 
3 I believe this double-edged nature of Freeman’s and Snoeck Henkemans’s work has been 
recognized by an exponent of the dialectical approach: Erik Krabbe has recently stated that the 
dialectical “obligation to handle objections can, in solo argument, be dealt with within the 
structure of a basic argument” (Krabbe 2000, 3), a basic argument being his (Walton and Krabbe 
1995) label for what here I am calling complex argument.  Similarly, he has suggested that 
“when studying more complex dialogues in which fallacy criticism is undertaken, not by an 
external evaluator, but by the participants themselves, profiles [i.e., sequences] of dialogue can 
again be used as a heuristic device” (Krabbe 2002, 155).  
 
4 Blair’s clear distinction between (what he calls) the dialogue conception and (what I am 
calling) the evaluative conception of dialectics suggests the need to explore their relationship to 
other notions of dialectics, such as the classical Hegelian concept (cf. Finocchiaro 1988) and, 
more recently,  Hilary “Putnam’s dialectical thinking” (Cummings 2002). 
 
5 This definition has remained essentially unchanged at least since the third edition of this classic 
textbook, which had “evidence” (Copi 1968, 7) in place of “support or grounds.”. 
 
6 This is almost the reverse of Johnson’s (2000a) view, as it will emerge below. 
 
7 See also Kalish and Montague (1964, 13), quoted in Johnson (2000a, 123): “an argument, as we 
shall understand it, consists of two parts—first, a sequence of sentences called its premises and 
secondly, an additional sentence called its conclusion”; see also Angeles (1981, 18), quoted in 
Walton (1990, 408): it defines argument as “a series of statements called premises logically 
related to a further statement called the conclusion.” 
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8 Cf. Epstein (2002, 5): “We’re trying to define ‘argument’.  We said it was an attempt to 
convince someone, using language, that a claim is true.  … An argument is a collection of 
claims, one of which is called the conclusion whose truth the argument is intended to establish; 
the others are called the premises, which are supposed to lead to, or support, or convince that the 
conclusion is true.”  Cf. also Govier (1989, 117). 
 
9 Although these three definitions are increasingly more complex and narrow, they are not 
necessarily increasingly more adequate, for as I shall argue below, the move from the 
“justification” of the illative definition to the “persuasion” of the rhetorical definition may not 
yield an increase in adequacy.  
 
10 Besides Goldman, Reed (2000, 1) may be attributed this concept when he says, “The most 
fundamental problem facing the designer of an argument is premise availability: do there exist 
premises which can support a given conclusion or which can rebut or undercut some 
counterargument?” 
 
11 She makes it clear that she is speaking from the “pragma-dialectical” point of view of the 
Amsterdam school of argumentation studies, and indeed one can find statements to this effect in 
such works as Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 73), Snoeck Henkemans (1992, 179), and 
Eemeren et al. (1993, 12, 14). 
 
12 I first learned of this collector’s piece from Reed and Long (1998, 3). 
 
13 This point about novelty is, of course, not novel.  Johnson anticipates it to some degree 
(2000a, 336) and discusses it implicitly in replying to the objection that his own definition of 
argument is similar to Toulmin’s notion of rebuttal (Johnson 2000a, 173-74).  See also section 6 
below. 
 
14 In this sentence and the next one, I am (for the sake of the argument) using Johnson’s 
distinction between evaluation and criticism, although it seems to me that the concept of 
evaluation is broader than he allows and thus includes the concept of criticism as a special case; 
cf. Johnson 2000a, 217-23. 
 
15 This only means that any alternative position generates an objection, not that any objection 
yields an alternative position.  Indeed, as Govier (1999b, 226-27) has argued, many objections do 
not involve alternative positions; for example, counterexamples to generalizations are objections 
but do not constitute alternatives.  At times Johnson (2000a, 206-9) speaks of the dialectical as 
having a third part, namely dealing with undesirable consequences or implications of one’s 
position; elsewhere he (Johnson 1998, 2) seems to accept Govier’s (1998, 7-8) friendly critical 
revision that this is a special case of replying to objections; in still other places, Johnson (2002b, 
3-4) speaks of four types of dialectical material, namely objections, alternative positions, 
criticism, and challenges.  Such discussions suggest that more work is needed to clarify the 
concept of objection; indeed some scholars (Finocchiaro 1997, 314-18; Govier 1999b, 229-32; 
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Johnson [2000b; 2002b]; Krabbe 2002, 160-62) have undertaken this task, but much more 
remains to be done. 
 
16 Johnson (2000a, 171 n. 20) attributes this objection to Blair in Blair and Johnson (1987); one 
can also find it in Govier (1998).  This objection was also implicitly raised above in my criticism 
of Johnson’s inductive generalization argument, when I asked whether the conclusion should be 
formulated as saying that all arguments have a dialectical tier, or that all good arguments have it. 
 
17 This paradox is a version of the problem discussed by Johnson (2000a, 223-36) in connection 
with his principle of vulnerability and his argument that no argument is conclusive.  Mill (1965, 
293-95 = On Liberty, ch. 2, par. 31-33) also discusses a version of this problem. 
 
18 Hitchcock (2002a, 7), Hansen (2002, 273-74); cf. the reply in Johnson 2002a, 327-29. 
 
19 I am of course referring to the Hegelian view of dialectic as the synthesis of a thesis and an 
antithesis.  My reference is made partly in jest, for I am aware that it is questionable whether this 
triadic interpretation of Hegelian dialectic is anything more than a vulgar oversimplification and 
has anything more to do with the dialectical philosophy of Hegel than the terza rima has 
anything to do with the poetry and art of Dante’s Divine Comedy; cf. Findlay (1964 , 353) and 
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